Introduction
In 'Restorative Justice and Child Sex Offences: The Theory and the Practice', British Journal of Criminology, 48(3): 359-78, Annie Cossins (2008: 360) says there is 'insufficient evidence' to show that restorative justice (the conference process) is better than court for victims of sexual assault.
1 Because there may be 'real limits in the values, processes and practices of restorative justice' (p. 362), she proposes that greater effort should be placed on legal reforms such as vulnerable witness protection programmes or specialist sexual violence courts (p. 375). I begin with several key points; then, I correct and challenge several misrepresentations and assumptions in Cossins' article. I note areas where we agree, but a significant difference is that I call for a more radical agenda for change. My arguments draw largely, but not exclusively, from my research on youth justice conferences and their application to sexual and family violence cases in Australia, together with a meta-review of attrition studies in five countries. The evidence suggests that legal reforms have produced modest gains for victims: that is why alternative justice practices should be pursued, researched, and evaluated. Writing this reply has helped me to clarify my position and extend upon it. For that, I am appreciative of Cossins' analysis and critique because it permits a constructive debate, which identifies points of contention and areas for further research.
Three key points
I consider the problems of evidence, present the findings from my research, and outline a proposal for more radical change.
Point one: It takes time to gather and produce quality evidence that compares established court processes with alternative justice practices. Cossins is right to say there is a paucity of evidence comparing the experiences of court and conference victims (pp. 362, 368) , which begs the question: why is that so? The answer is there are few places in the world where restorative justice is routinely used for adults or youth charged with sexual assault. My research is among the first to gather evidence on youths charged with sexual assault and family violence, whose cases were finalized by conference (see also Koss 2006; Pennell 2006 SAAS could not compare the feelings or experiences of court victims (most of whom were under 12 years of age) and conference victims (most under 8), or their carers, for offences that occurred some years ago. However, it is possible to depict victims' court and conference journeys, and to compare the qualities, contexts, and outcomes of sex offending cases that go to court and conference. Among the findings are that victim advocates should not assume that the court is a site of vindication for victims, and that the court's penalty regime is largely focused on scaring youth with threats of future legal liability, not about changing behaviour. Further, there is a need to focus on police interactions with suspects before their denials harden (see below), and to consider the benefits to both suspects and victims of early pleas and conference dispositions (Daly 2006a: 351-52 I do not advocate replacing the established court system with restorative justice; this is impossible because, as yet, there exists no fact-finding mechanism in restorative justice.
However, one of several ways to encourage early admissions is diversionary conferences.
Conferences can also parallel a court process, e.g., convened to provide pre-sentence advice or supplemental activities in the sentencing process (Sherman and Strang 2007: 52) . They can also be used when offenders are completing sentences, as a vehicle to increase a victim's or community's sense of safety. The court's guilty plea process can change (Combs 2007 Cossins, p. 371) . In the published and ms. version, we say in the last several sentences: 'This is the power of the conference process in cases of sexual assault, although it is dependent on the participants' and professionals' modes of intervention.
Yet this fragile power may be one way of redefining the realities of rape and sexual assault'
(emphasis added). Cossins overlooks the contingent nature of 'the power' of a conference process, to which we give considerable attention in that article.
Drawing from Wundersitz's (2003: 5) 
Challenging Assumptions and Claims
In arguing her case, Cossins makes several assumptions and claims, which I should like to challenge.
Cossins says that 'one of the goals of restorative justice is to divert the offender from the criminal justice system' (p. 361, emphasis added, citing Lewis et al. 2001 ), but diversion is just one of several legal contexts (not goals) of restorative justice. She worries that if conferences are used only as diversion from court, serious offences will not be treated seriously (that is, punished sufficiently) and processes may not be accountable and transparent. Further, she is concerned about adequate follow-up. Her core concern is the appearance of too lenient outcomes, which may send the wrong message to others. This sits in the symbolic register of criminal justice.
Better to focus on 'effective justice' (Hudson 2002) , which includes mechanisms for vindicating victims, alongside better responses, sanctions, and programmes for a wide range of offenders and offending contexts, not just a minority who seem to fit a worst case scenario of 'child sex offender'. On accountability and 'public scrutiny', Cossins overlooks the fact that youth court proceedings are typically closed to the public. As for follow-up, all judicial officers I know desire more information about the monitoring of sentenced offenders for compliance. This is not a problem confined to conferences or youth offenders.
In Cossins' list of potential strengths of restorative justice (pp. 361-62), she combines varied views, giving the impression that those who support restorative justice for sexual violence speak in one voice. We do not. I do not believe we should expect reconciliation of a victim and offender, or victim forgiveness, or that these are (or should be) goals of restorative justice for any offence. I have shown that sincere apologies were atypical in the SAJJ cases (Daly 2003: 224) and could not be discerned from the SAAS data (Daly 2006a: 349) . I have emphasized the nominal meaning of 'restorative' in restorative justice; and I have documented the limits of restorative justice (Daly 2006b ), including its application to partner, sexual, and family violence (Daly and Stubbs 2006) . What is presented by Cossins as 'contradictory justifications ' (p. 362) by advocates for restorative justice is better typified as differing ways of seeing the value of restorative justice processes.
Cossins assumes that what is positive for victims (such as describing the impact of victimization, others validating the account, and holding an offender accountable) will necessarily 'mean that an offender's behaviour will change' (p. 367). On the contrary, I believe that it is important to separate the two: responses may be highly successful for some victims, but not cause offenders to change their behaviour. Moreover, justice 'outcomes' should not be confined solely to assessments of re-offending, as Cossins seems to argue (p. 368) (see also Robinson and Shapland 2008 
Concluding Points
Those who are sceptical of restorative justice for sexual violence have not produced evidence to
show that established court processes are better for victims. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the gains from legal reforms are modest. Cossins and I agree that more needs to be done, both with respect to comparative research and socio-legal change.
It is widely acknowledged that victims of sexual violence want vindication for the offence (Hermann 2005). Such vindication is not possible when the likelihood of conviction, once a case is reported to the police, is low. One reason that victims engage the legal process is they hope that by their efforts, an offender won't hurt another person. The South Australian Mary Street programme for youth sex offending was part of the outcome for 52 per cent of conference and 37
per cent of court youth in the SAAS research. Controlling for relevant factors, this programme had significant effects in reducing re-offending, 9 whether the case was finalized in court or by conference (Daly 2006a: 350) .
Cossins is right to say that if the aim is to reduce re-offending, emphasis must be placed on effective treatment. The pity is that relatively few court youth in SAAS had the chance to be considered because almost half of the court cases were dismissed. Furthermore, the highest rates of re-offending were associated with youths who received detention sentences (almost all of which were suspended). The court has greater clout than a diversionary conference to sentence youth more severely, but it uses that clout to threaten future legal liability, which alone cannot be expected to change behaviour.
I have proposed a more radical agenda for change that centres on establishing social and legal mechanisms to encourage early admissions to offending (only when offending has occurred, of course). This will have positive consequences for vindicating victims and for engaging offenders on a path toward change. Along with admissions, outcomes (or sentences) for offenders should include participation in effective treatment programmes. I agree with Cossins that early admissions and treatment can be encouraged with a variety of diversionary or nondiversionary options, not just with conferences or restorative justice. However, the conference process does permit victims (or others, such as family members) to describe the effects of an offence, and it permits conference participants to check and challenge offenders when they make excuses or deny the seriousness of offending. Such interactions and communication can occur at any stage of the criminal process: during a plea, pre-sentence, at sentence, or post-sentence.
Legal reform may benefit some victims of rape and sexual assault, but more significant change is required. By identifying appropriate ways to increase admissions to offending, the need for factfinding and trial is reduced. For those accused, admissions will seem a more rational choice than denials when sex offending is not subject to hyper stigmatization and demonization. It is important to have in mind the diverse contexts of sexual victimization, not just child sexual abuse between an individual adult and child in an affluent society. An individualized model of prosecution and trial is often not relevant or workable in many contexts, including violence in children's homes or institutions (including historical cases), collective and individual violence in war and conflict zones, and violence against women and children in developing societies and in racial/ethnic or immigrant enclaves in developed societies. Innovation in these contexts is especially urgent.
